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U.S. BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL AID TO NATIONS
WHICH DO NOT COOPERATE WITH THE UNITED
STATES TO COMBAT INTERNATIONAL DRUG TRAFFIC
By the early 1970s, the spread of heroin addiction in the
United States had become an issue of national concern. Although
narcotics had long played a destructive role in the inner city, the
federal government's response to drug abuse did not become evident until larger numbers of servicemen began returning as addicts
from the War in Southeast Asia.' Not only GIs stationed in Southeast Asia, but also those assigned to Europe, especially to West
Germany, and stateside were becoming more involved with drugs.2
Within the United States, the number of suspected addicts had
skyrocketed over a short span of time. One doctor estimated an
addiction prevalence rate of approximately 150 per 100,000 popt,1. International Aspects of tile Narcotics Problem, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Europe of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 92d Cong.. Ist Sess.
32-48 (1971) (testimony of Rep. Rangel). President Nixon first declared that
"America's public enemy number I in the United States is drug abuse" in June
of 1971. 7 Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 930 (197 ).
2. A report from Major Forest S. Tennant, Jr., a surgeon attaded to the 3d
Infantry Division headquarters at Wurzburg, West Germany. stated that 46% of
all U.S. troops in Europe had used drugs at least once; 22% of those then using
drugs had begun while stationed in Germany. Johnson and Wilson. "Our
Strung-Out Troops and the Big 0," Washington Post, Sept. 14. 1971: reprinted in
117 Cong. Rec. 32045-47 (1971) (remarks of Rep. Rangel).
Brigadier General George J. Hayes, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Health and Environment, suggested to a House subcommittee that
the major reasons for increased drug use in Vietnam were:
1. Emotional stress on the individual.
2. Availability of drugs.
3. Susceptible personality.
The stresses associated with duty in Vietnam include primarily ph)sical
danger, boredom, peer prewssure from drug users and maladjustment

related to a foreign environment. Further, it is dear that involvement in
drug use by our servicemen has risen with tie influx of readily available
and cheap drugs.
Lastly, some individuals are more susceptible than others to drug use in
Vietnam similar to that occurring here at home.
Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention, Hearings on H.R. 9264 and

H.R. 9059 Before the Subcomm. on Public Health and Environment of the
House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. pt. I, at
358-359 (1971).
On the problem of drug addiction inl the armed forces ii tihe early 1970s. se

generally Drug and Alcohol Abuse in the Military, Hearings Before the Special
Subcomm. on Alcoholism and Narcotics of the Senate Comm. on Labor and
Public Welfare, 91st Cong., 2d Se.s. (1970); and Drug Addiction and Abuse
among Military Veterans, 1971. Joint Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health
and Hospitals of the Senate Comm. on Veterans Affairs and the Subcomm. on
Alcoholism and Narcotics of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare.
92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
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lation, and increasing.3 In May 1972 Dr. Jerome Jaffe, then Director of the Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention within
the Executive Office of the President, put the American addict population at 250,000-500,000. 4 Coupled with this rapid growth of
heroin addiction at home was the inability of law enforcement
officials-federal, state, and local-to substantially prevent the
smuggling of heroin into the United States.5
This Note will review the legislative mandate to terminate U.S.
bilateral and multilateral aid to countries which condone drug production and trafficking. It will survey presidential non-enforcement
of this statutory mandate during the Nixon Administration and
explore the controversies over continuing aid to Thailand, a narcotics-producing nation. Finally, this Note will suggest the limitations of unilateral sanctions against countries which do not adequately cooperate with the U.S. to control drug traffic.

I. FOREIGN AID AND DRUGS: CONGRESS ACmS

The opium poppy is not grown in the United States. 0 In the
early 1970s the major areas of opium poppy cultivation were in IIIdia and the Golden Triangle region of Burma, Thailand and Laos.
Other producers included Pakistan, Afghanistan, 7 Tttrkey, 8 Iran,
3. Pillard, Shall We Allow Heroin Maintenance? 288 New Eng. J. Med. 682
(1973).
4. Koran, Heroin Maintenance for Heroin Addicts: Issues and Evidence, 288
New Eng. J. Med. 654, 655 (1973).
A Senate committee pointed out that "[a] key deficiency in federal drug
enforcement is that the data base for assessing the true dimensions of the heroin
problem is, at best, woefully inadequate and, at worst, a horrendous scandal."
Senate Comm. on Government Operations, Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1973,
Establishing a Drug Enforcement Administration in the Dep't of Justice, S. Rep.
No. 93-469, 93d Cong., 1st Sss. 10 (1973).
5. See, e.g., Comptroller General of the United States, Efforts to Prevent
Heroin from Illicitly Reaching the United States, B-164031 (2) (1972); Comptroller General of the United States, Heroin Being Smuggled into New York City
Successfully, B--164031 (2) (1972).
6. International Aspects of the Narcotics Problem, supra note 1, at 1 (remarks of Rep. Rosenthal).
7. One U.S. agency has estimated 1972 Afghan production of illicit opium at
100-120 tons, and 1973 production from 100-150 tons. Letter from John E.
Ingersoll (Director, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs) to Charles B.
Rangel, June 1, 1973. At the same time, the Director indicated that "There [was]
no evidence of Afghan opium destined for the United States." Id.
However, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has expressed concern over
the fact that opium from Afghanistan could be smuggled into the U.S. The CIA
also noted that existing networks for smuggling drugs to Iran through Afghanistan from Pakistan "could be used for a redirected flow of illicit opium that
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the Central Asian republics of the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe,
and scattered parts of Australia, Mexico, and South America. 0
Because many of the countries involved in the production,
processing or transportation of opium poppies, morphine base and
heroin were nations receiving large amounts of foreign aid from the
United States, pressure grew in Congress to CtL off funds to such
countries if they continued to condone or ignore drug-related activities within their borders. The withholding of economic or military
might well reach the United States." Directorate of Intelligence. Central Intelligence Agency, Narcotics in Iran, International Narcotics Series No. 13. para. 35
(Intelligence Memorandum). See also, Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, South Asia: A Potential Source of Illicit Opium for tle U.S.
Market, International Narcotics Series, June 26. 1972 (Intelligence Memorandum).
8. On June 30, 1971, a ban on growing opium poppies was ordered by then
Turkish prime minister Nihat Eritn to go into full effect by June 1972. In the
first year, strict licensing and control was mandated. 'otal ornflawing of opium
poppy production was required in the second %ear. 65 Dp't of State 111111.
74-77 (1971).
On July 1. 1974, however, a new Turkish government isud a decree
authorizing opium poppy production. Decision on tie Issuance of Permission
for the Cultivation of the Opium Poppy in Seven Provinces during tile1974-75
Season, Decree No. 7/8522, reprinted in 120 Cong. Rec. 116167-68 (dail) ed.
l on
July 2, 1974) (remarks of Rep. Rodino). Germination of opita,, poppy cd%
government farms and agricultural stations had begun .smeral months earlier.
In response to the Turkish announcement, the House of Representatives
passed a concurrent resolution calling oi the Pr sident to "iIlmiLdiattely initiate
negotiations at the highest level of the Turkish Gocrmnt"L to insture Coltinuation of the ban and other controls oil opium poppy prdtzction. The
resolution also called on the President to use his statutory powcrs to "suspend all
assistance" to Turkey if the negotiations failed. H. Con. Res. 507. 93d Cong..
2d Sess. (1974). House debate on the concurrent resolution appears at 120 Cong.
Rec. H7656-66 (daily ed. Aug. 5. 1974). Later, the House passed H.R. 15977,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), the Export-Import Bank Act Anendments. whid
contained a provision prohibiting Eximbank from insuring, guaranteeing, or extending credit to Turkey without a presidential report to Congress tlat Turke)
was cooperating with American anti-drug activities. Debatc nutthe hill appears
at 120 Cong. Rec. H8805-36 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1974).
The Senate reacted to the lifting of the Turkish ban by passing ai amendment to the Comprehensive Drug Abuse and ContLrol Act of 1970. The amendment required the President to cut off all aid bfy January I,1975 to any government which allowed poppy production unless the President determinucd that a
ban was in effect or certified that the safeguards adopted by the government
concerned were adequate to prevent the diversion of opium into illicit markets.
120 Cong. Rec. S12300 (daily ed. July 11,1974). Another major provision of the
amendment authorized Congress to adopt a concurrent resohtion finding that
a country has not instituted such safeguards or "effectively banned tie growing
of opium poppies"; upon passage of a concurrent resohtion. the President
would be required to "immediately suspend" all assistance to that nation. Id.
Debate on the amendment appears at 120 Cong. Rec. S12300-21 (daily ed. July
11, 1974).
9. Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control. World Opium
Survey 1972, at .-4, AI-A63 (1972).
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assistance to coerce other governments into cracking down on narcotics trafficking was strongly opposed by the State Department,
which favored continuing the traditional policy of negotiations and
moral suasion to encourage cooperation. The State Department was
also willing to earmark foreign aid funds for narcotics control
projects. 1°
Harvey R. Wellman, then Special Assistant to the Secretary of
State for Narcotics Matters, articulated the Foggy Bottom position
in testimony before House and Senate committees considering legislation mandating the termination of foreign' aid to non-cooperating
countries. Wellman told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
that Congress and the President shared the policy goal of controlling drugs and that the'State Department's responsibility was to effectuate that goal. In the State Department's view, a threatened
cut-off of aid would not be consistent with that objective. The result, Wellman warned, might be internal political pressure within
the affected nations which would hamper any cooperative efforts
sought by the United States."
Wellman gave similar testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe, reiterating the Administration's
stance that a cessation of aid would not be an effective tactic. He
emphasized the State Department preference for cooperation rather
12
than what he viewed as coercion.
Other witnesses at the hearings attacked the State Department
approach as too mild. Representative Charles B. Rangel (D-N.Y.),
chairman of the Congressional Black Caucus' subcommittee on
drug abuse, told the House subcommittee, "... I suppose we
could have negotiated with Cuba when we suspected they had missiles over there but I did somehow believe this Nation felt it was a
national threat."'1 3 Representative Robert H. Steele (R-Conn.) 14
differentiated between Turkey, "which essentially was a Western
ally" where lie felt that an aid cut-off would have backfired and
10. See generally the testimony of State Department officials, International
Traffic in Narcotics, Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 92d
Cong., IstSess. (1971); International Aspects of the Narcotics Problem, supra
note I.
11. International Traffic in Narcotics, supra note 10, at 102, 104.
12. International Aspects of the Narcotics Problem, supra note 1,at 75-76.
13. Id. at 41.
14. Rep. Steele, together with Rep. Morgan F. Murphy (D-Ill.) had conducted a special study tour to Europe and Asia on international drug trafficking for
the House Foreign Affairs Committee in April 1971, three months prior to this
testimony. See The World Heroin Problem, Report of Special Study Mission of
the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (Comm. Print 1971).
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"gotten their backs up," and Southeast Asia where such a tactic
might be successful. 15
The Nixon Administration proposed, as an alternative to the
Congressional aid cut-off proposals, the earmarking of assistance to
help recipient nations control narcotics trafficking. The Administration plan made no mention of sanctions, economic or otherwise.
The proposal was in the form of an amendment to pending foreign
aid legislation' 6 and was not received as a radical innovation.
On July 26, 1971, the House Foreign Affairs Committee reported out the Foreign Assistance Act of 1971, H.R. 9910,17
which contained a narcotics control provision. The Committee
found that effective international cooperation was necessary to end
international drug trafficking. The Committee's version authorized the President to enter into agreements with other governments
to facilitate control over drug trafficking and to provide foreign aid
to both countries and international organizations for narcotics
control. s The report stated:
The committee recognizes that some countries may not
wish to cooperate in solving the narcotics problem. Such countries should not benefit from conce-ssional assistance provided
by the United States. 9
The Committee's version of the amendment required the President
to suspend military sales and aid, economic assistance and sales of
agricultural commodities when he determined that the government
involved had not taken adequate steps to stop the sale of narcotics
produced or processed there from being either smuggled into the
United States or sold to U.S. government personnel abroad.2 0 On
August 3, 1971, after amending the narcotics provision to include
other controlled substances and to provide the same treatment for
countries which accept the transportation of narcotics across their
borders en route to the United States or to American servicemen
15. International Aspects of the Narcotics Problem, supra note 1.at 28.
16. The text of the proposed amendment was contained in a letter from David
M. Abshire, Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations. to Spiro T.
Agnew, President of the Senate, June 21, 1971; reprinted in International
Traffic in Narcotics, supra note 10. at 117-8.
17. 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971).
18. H.R. Rep. No. 92--380, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 40 (1971).
19. Id. at 22.
20. Id.
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abroad, 21 the House passed the bill by a vote of 220-192.22 The
House rejected an amendment offered by Representative Rangel
which would have required the President to obtain a specific waiver
of the cut-off mandate from Congress if he believed that the "overriding national interest" put continuation of aid ahead of the need
23
for drug-related economic sanctions.
When the legislation was referred to the Senate, the Foreign
24
Relations Committee reported out a narcotics control provision
which included the following major departures from the House version: (1) 'specific authorization of a minimum of $25 million each
fiscal year to carry out the provisions of the new international drug
control assistance title; (2) the requirement of an annual determination by the President of whether a country has undertaken appropriate drug control measures prior to furnishing foreign aid to that
country; (8) a requirement that the President ask the United Nations to impose international sanctions on those countries which, by
his determination, were not cooperating with the United States in
fighting international drug production, processing and smuggling;
(4) a requirement that the President use United States government
facilities and agencies to assist other nations in controlling narcotics
traffic; and (5) a prohibition on waiver of the act's aid cut-off provisions by the President.2 5 It was on the Senate floor, however, that
the bill passed by the House encountered more serious opposition.
After four days of debate and consideration (October 26-29,
1971), the Senate defeated the entire bill by a vote of 27-41.20
The Foreign Relations Committee analyzed the Senate rejection of the bill as being due in large part to the inclusion of humanitarian and economic development assistance, as well as military
programs within the same authorization.2 7 As a result, the Committee reported out two bills,2 8 thereby allowing the Senators to
vote on the individual programs.
21. These amendments were offered by Rep. John S. Monagan (D-Conn.), a
member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and were accepted without
objection as a "technical perfection of the language," in the words of the
Committee's ranking minority member, Rep. William S. Maillard (R.Calif.). 117
Cong. Rec. 29103 (1971).
22. 117 Cong. Rec. 29137 (1971).
23. The text and debate on this amendment appear in 117 Cong. Rec. 29103-07
(1971).
24. S. Rep. No. 92-404, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
25. 117 Cong. Rec. 37523-24 (1971).
26. 117 Cong. Rec. 38283 (1971). For debate on the bill in the Senate, see
117 Cong. Rec. at 37523-42, 37726-51, 37981-38031, 38228-86 (1971).
27. For the Committee's discussion of the bill's defeat on the Senate floor, see
S. Rep. No. 92-432, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1971).
28. S. 2820, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971) was the new bill authorizing economic and humanitarian aid.
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The revised version expanded congressional supervision over
enforcement of the narcotics control provision by requiring that a
report be submitted to Congress within 90 days after the President's
annual determination as to whether each nation receiving foreign
aid had been adequately cooperating. In addition, with respect to
any action taken under the aid cessation requirement, a presidential
report to Congress would be mandated. In the report, the President
would provide Congress with a detailed assessment of each aid recipient's efforts in the area so that, according to the Foreign Relations Committee, "Congress and the American people might have
some way of judging the President's actions on continuing or cutting off aid to a particular aid recipient.'"2
On November 11, 1971, the Senate passed the Special Foreign
Economic and Humanitarian Assistance Act of 1971 by a vote of
61-23.30 The bill returned to the House of Representatives where,
after amendment, it was passed on November 18, and then went to
a House-Senate conference. The conferees adopted the House language on international narcotics control. 31 The Senate agreed to
the conference report on December 17; the House followed suit on
January 25, 1972.
On February 7, 1972, President Nixon signed the Foreign Assistance Act of 1971 into law. The statute now contains the following provisions:
It is the sense of Congress that effective international cooperation is necessary to put an end to the illicit production, trafficking in, and abuse of dangerous drugs. In order to promote
such cooperation, the President is authorized to conclude
agreements with other countries to facilitate control of the production, processing, transportation, and distribution of narcoic analgesics, including opium and its derivatives, other narcotic drugs and psychotropics and other controlled substances as
defined in the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and
Control Act of 1970 (Public Law 91-513). Notwithstanding
any other provision of law, the President is authorized to furnish assistance to any country or international organization, on
such terms and conditions as he may determine, for the con29. S. Rep. No. 92-432, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 32-33 (1971). This revision
reflected a floor amendment offered by Sen. Jennings Randolph (DAV. Va.) and
adopted by the Senate during the earlier consideration of the bill. 117 Cong. Rec.
38242 (1971). The new language, as reported out of committee and passed by the
Senate, appears in 117 Cong. Rec. 40417-18 (1971).
30. 117 Cong. Rec. 40415 (1971). Senate debate on the bill appears in 117
Cong. Rec. 40157-74, 40379-40418 (1971).
31. H.R. Rep. No. 92-761, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1971); S. Rep. No. 92-590,
92d Cong., Ist Sess. 23 (1971).
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trol of the production of, processing of, and traffic in, narcotic
and psychotropic drugs. In furnishing such assistance the President may use any of the funds made available to carry out the
provisions of this Act. The President shall suspend economic
and military assistance furnished under this or any other Act,
and shall suspend sales under the Foreign Military Sales Act
and under title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and
Assistance Act of 1954, with respect to any country when the
President determines that the government of such country has
failed to take adequate steps to prevent narcotic drugs and
other controlled substances (as defined by the Comprehensive
Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970) produced
or processed, in whole or in part, in such country, or transported through such country, from being sold illegally within
the jurisdiction of such country to United States Government
personnel or their dependents, or from entering the United
States unlawfully. Such suspension shall continue until the
President determines that the Government of such country has
taken adequate steps to carry out the provisions of this
32
chapter.
The statute thus eliminated the reporting provisions, the requirement of an annual presidential determination of the cooperation of
each aid recipient, and an explicit congressional watchdog role-all
of which had appeared in the Senate bill. The compromise later led
to a sharp reduction in the willingness and ability of Congress to review Executive implementation of the statute. In addition, when the
President signed the Foreign Assistance Act, he made no mention
of his new aid cut-off powers 33-perhaps an omen of the President's own lack of interest in using those powers which he and the
State Department had opposed.

II.

DRUGS AND THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL

INSTITUTIONS:

CONGRESS

SPEAKS

Congress had forged a weapon by which aid could be terminated by unilateral American action for reasons unrelated to the
economic needs of recipient nations: the Foreign Assistance Act of
1971's drug control provision. The next move was to use multilateral economic aid as another means of putting financial pressure on
32. 22 U.S.C.A. § 2291; 86 Stat. 496; Pub. L. 92-226 (1972).
33. 8 Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 214 (1972).
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nations to cooperate with the United States in suppressing drug
traffic.
In October of 1971, before debating the foreign assistance legislation, the Senate had passed legislation (1) authorizing the payment and appropriation of the second and third installments of the
United States contributions to the Fund for Special Operations of
the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) ,4 (2) authorizing
United States contributions to the Special Funds of the Asian Development Bank (ADB),35 and' (3) providing for increased participation by the United States in the International Development Association (IDA).s6 These three bills emerged from the Senate
without any provision relating to international drug control.
On February 1, 1972, the House of Representatives considered the legislation and added two significant amendments. The
first was sponsored by Representative Henry B. Gonzalez (D-Texas), chairman of the Subcommittee on International Finance of the
House Banking and Currency Committee. The Gonzalez amendmeants required the United States to oppose "any loan or other utilization of the funds" of ADB, IDB and IDA for the benefit of a
country which: (1) nationalized, expropriated or seized ownership
or control of American-owned property without adequate compensation; (2) repudiated or nullified contracts with United States citizens or corporations; or (3) discriminated in taxes or enforced restrictive maintenance or operational conditions against United
States-owned property within its borders such as to constitute de
facto nationalization or expropriation without full compensation.
This provision was to apply unless arrangements for "prompt, adequate, and effective compensation" had been made, the parties
were arbitrating the dispute under the rules of the Convention for
the Settlement of Investment Disputes, or "good faith negotiations"
over compensation were taking place.37
The second amendment adopted by the House to each of the
three bills was offered by Representative Rangel. The Rangel
amendments required that the United States oppose any loans or
other utilization of funds from the international development institutions to countries which the President determined to be doing less
than an adequate job in combating international drug trafficking.
Rangel argued that the problem of heroin addiction within the
34. S. 748, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971).
35. S. 749, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971).
36. S. 2010, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971).
37, ADB legislation, 22 U.S.C.A. § 285o, 86 Stat. 58; IDB legislation, 22
U.S.C.A. § 283r, 86 Stat. 59; IDA legislation. 22 U.S.CA. § 284j, 86 Stat. 60.
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United States and among GIs overseas was an even more critical issue than that of uncompensated expropriation of American business
and investment interests abroad. During debate, Rangel stated that
the President should order the Secretary of the Treasury to vote
against any loan or credit to a country which condoned the growing
of opium poppies, the processing of morphine and the trafficking of
heroin with knowledge that the drugs were targeted for shipment to
38
the United States.
The House-Senate conference committee3 adopted the Gonzalez and Rangel amendments passed by the House. 40 The House
agreed to the conference report on February 22, 1972; the Senate
did the same on March 1. And on March 10, the President signed
the bills, all of which contained statutory language nearly identical
to this provision in the ADB bill:
The Secretary of the Treasury shall instruct the United States
Executive Director of the Asian Development Bank to vote
against any loan or other utilization of the funds of the Bank
for the benefit of any country with respect to which the President has made a determination, and so notified the Secretary
of the Treasury, that the government of such country has
failed to take adequate steps to prevent narcotic drugs and
other controlled substances (as defined by the Comprehensive
Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970) produced
or processed, in whole or in part, in such country, or transported through such country, from being sold illegally within
the jurisdiction of such country to United States Government
personnel or their dependents, or from entering the United
States unlawfully. Such instruction shall continue in effect until the President determines, and so notifies the Secretary of
the Treasury, that the government of such country has taken
38. 118 Cong. Rec. 2031 (1972) (remarks of Rep. Rangel).
39. H.R. Rep. No. 92-830, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); S. Rep. No. 92-607,
92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
40. The conference committee deleted a House-passed amendment to the
IDB bill offered by Rep. Glenn M. Anderson (D-Calif.) which would have
required the United States to oppose any loan or utilization of funds to a nation
which had seized a U.S. vessel in territorial waters or the high seas on the basis
of rights not recognized by the United States and where a fine or other direct
charge had been paid to secure release of the vessel and crew. 118 Cong.
Rec. 2027 (1972). The Anderson amendment resulted from the seizure by
Ecuador of approximately 50 American tuna ships in 1971 and six more in the
first month of 1972. There was also a fear that Costa Rica would follow
Ecuador's lead and claim an extension of territorial waters in order to seize
United States fishing ships oft its coast.
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adequate steps to prevent such sale or entry of narcotic drugs
4
and other controlled substances. '
As he had done when signing the foreign assistance legislation, the
President did not mention the drug provisions when he signed these
bills.42

III.

THAILAND, DRUGs AND

U.S.

FOREIGN AID

Thailand, then a partner in the military endeavors of ihe United States in Southeast Asia, has had a history of producing opium
poppies. Thailand, together with neighboring Burma and Laos,
comprises the Golden Triangle which has produced an' estimated
750 tons of illicit opium annually.43 The Thai share of this crop
has been put at 130-200 tons.44 Of the total production, 450 tons
are believed to be consumed locally in rural sections of the region.
The remainder is distributed to wholesalers in Bangkok, Hong
Kong and Vientiane. As of 1972, the wholesalers used approximately 100 tons to supply local urban demand and processed the
balance into heroin for American servicemen in Southeast Asia, the
Philippines, and Okinawa, and for shipment to the United States.
The question of Thai cooperation or lack of cooperation with
the United States in fighting this drug traffic has been complicated
by several critical factors. Among them are the failure of the central
government of Thailand to exercise control over parts of its own
territory, corruption among government officials at high and low
levels, and the lack of Thai personnel trained in narcotics control
and properly equipped. A major problem leading the Thai government to put opium poppy eradication at a low priority is the government's overriding concern with its own survival in the face of
Communist insurgents. In addition, the Thai government has felt
that it has leverage against the United States due to the American
41. 22 U.S.C.A. § 2 8 5 p, 86 Stat. 58. The parallel provisions appear in the
IDB legislation, 22 U.S.C.A. § 283s, 86 StaL 60; and in the IDA legislation. 22
U.S.C.A. § 284k, 86 Stat. 61.
42. 8 Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 554-55 (1972).
43. Strategic Intelligence Office. Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs,
Estimates of Illicit Opium Production Worldwide, I (1972).
44. World Drug Traffic and Its Impact on U.S. Security, Hearings Before lie
Subcomm. to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and
Other Internal Security Laws of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary. 92d Cong..
2d Sess., pt. 1, at 25 (1972) (testimony of General Walt).
45. Estimates of Illicit Opium Production Worldwide, supra note 43, at 1.
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desire to maintain strategically located air bases in Thailand. Finally, crop substitution programs have been inadequate, for economic
and cultural reasons, including the fear of an effective Communist
propaganda tool if economic hardships should arise from crop substitution.
Still another factor is the presence of Chinese Irregular Forces,
remnants of the Kuomintang army driven from China in 1949.
Roaming with virtually no restrictions through the Golden Triangle,
these military forces have become veritable armed merchant princes
who have acquired both wealth and power by purchasing the raw
opium from the hill tribesmen and transporting it to urban dealers.
Although the forces profess their willingness to retire from the opium trade in exchange for resettlment and Thai citizenship, their
40
avowed good intentions have been doubted.
The apparent indifference and lack of action by the Thai government in cracking down on its opium producers and traders led to
complaints in Congress. More acute criticism was levelled against
the Thais with the charge that some 26 tons of opinm-purchased
by the government with American funds from the Chinese Irregular
Forces and subsequently burned with great press fanfare-had been
primarily fodder and chemicals, only 20% raw opium. 47 The Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD) 48 vigorously denied the charges and BNDD chemists and officials testified that the
packages had been tested prior to immolation and that they were, in
fact, pure raw opium. The agency did admit, however, that the purchase had been made with .51 million provided by the United
States. 49 Jack Anderson, the columnist who first made the allegations, cited C.I.A. intelligence reports as the source of his
46. On problems of Thai suppression of drug trafficking, and on the role of
the Chinese Irregular Forces, see generally World Drug Traffic and Its Impact on
U.S. Security, pt. 1, supra note 44; Cabinet Comm. on Int'l Narcotics Control,
World Opium Survey 1972, supra note 9; The World Heroin Problem, supra
note 14; The U.S. Heroin Problem and Southeast Asia, Staff of House Comm. on
Foreign Affairs, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (Comm. Print 1973) ; The Narcotics Situation
in Southeast Asia, Special Study Mission of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs,
93d Cong., 1st Sess. (report by Rep. Wolff) (Comm. Print 1973) ; The Narcotics
Situation in Southeast Asia, 1973, Special Study Mission of the House Comm. on
Foreign Affairs, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (Comm. Print 1974).
47. Anderson, Thai Opium Bonfire Mostly Fodder, Washington Post, July
31, 1972; reprinted in World Drug Traffic and Its Impact on U.S. Security, pt. 1,
supra note 44, at 45-46.
48. On July 1, 1973, federal narcotics law enforcement agencies wcre rcorgan.
ized. Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1973, Establishing a Drug Enforcement
Administration in the Dep't of Justice, H.R. Doc. No. 93-69, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1973). The reorganization, inter alia, abolished BNDD and transferred its
functions to a new Drug Enfoicement Adininistartion.
49. For Congre.sional debate and hearings on the issue, see World Drug

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics

1974] INTERNATIONAL DRUG TRAFFIC

information ° Did the United States get 'taken' in the Thai opium
deal? There is still no certain answer.
The House Committee on Foreign Affairs, prodded by Representative Lester Wolff (D-N.Y.), reported out a provision in the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1972 which would have cut all foreign
aid to Thailand except that relating to narcotics control. 51 The bill,
H.R. 16029,52 contained the foreign assistance authorization for
fiscal 1973. The Committee's report charged that Thailand had
served as both a source and a pipeline for opium, morphine and
heroin reaching U.S. troops in South Vietnam and being smuggled
into the United States. The Committee voiced its fears that Southeast Asia would replace Turkey as the major source of illicit heroin
for the United States. Finally, the Committee expressed its hope
that Thailand would cooperate in suppressing drug traffic so that
the President could resume aid under the waiver authority of the
proposed amendment.5 3
The House, faced with the lack of presidential implementation
of the aid cut-off provision passed earlier in the year, decided to
force the President's hand with the Thai aid cut-off provision in the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1972. The House passed the bill on August 10, 1972. However, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
deleted the Thailand provision and instead included a provision for
the study of international narcotics traffic. 54 Although the Senate
version of H.R. 16029 was passed on September 26, 1972, the bill
died in conference, ending legislative consideration of the issue for
the 92nd Congress.

IV. PRESIDENTIAL NON-IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AID CUT-OFF

PROVISION

Congress had twice acted to express its view that American
foreign aid should be withheld from nations which (lid not cooperTraffic and Its Impact on U.S. Security, supra note 44, at 36-52; The U.S. Heroin
Problem and Southeast Asia, supra note 46, at 32-33; The Narcotics Situation in
Southeast Asia, supra note 45, at 4-5, 18-19; 118 Cong. Rec. 26003- 4 (1972)
(remarks of Rep. Wolff) ; 118 Cong. Rec. 26184 (1972) (remarks of Rep. Wolff);
118 Cong. Rec. 26318 (1972) (remarks of Rep. Rangel).
50. Anderson, Nixon's Forces Accused of Dirty Tricks, Washington Post, Oct.
17, 1972, at 15, Col.5.
51. H.R. 16029, 92d Cong.. 2d Se.i. (1972).
52. 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
53. H.R. Rep. No. 92-1273, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1972).
54. The report, S. Rep. No. 92-1182, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972). did not
explain why the House-approved provision on aid to Thailand unas not included.
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ate in international narcotics control and that United States support
should not be granted to such countries for loans from international
financial institutions. 5 On May 17, 1972, Representative Rangel
asked the General Accounting Office (GAO) to determine what
steps had been taken by the Nixon Administration to implement
these statutory provisions. 56
Several weeks later-approximately four months after the nar.
cotics control provision of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1971 and
some three months after the parallel provision in the international
financial institutions legislation had become law-the GAO sent a
preliminary reply, indicating that it had contacted State and Treasury Department officials and that its
. . . conversations with these officials, as well as the available
correspondence addressing itself to the question disclose[d]
that no negative determinations ha[d] been made with respect
to any country not cooperating in efforts to control illicit production, processing and trafficking of narcotics and other dangerous drugs.
. . . The Agency for International Development plan[ned] to
formulate a set of negative criteria, in consultation with other
agencies, ...
which would be applied in reaching a conclusion that a determination should be made by the President ...
. . . At the time of [its] discussion with Treasury and State
Department officials, ...
no written or formal procedures
had been prepared specifically to implement the assistance
57
cut-off provisions.
In a follow-up report to Representative Rangel in July 1972,
the Comptroller General stated that
. . . officials of the Departments of State and Treasury, [AID,
BNDD], and the Bureau of Customs [had] met to jointly develop a set of criteria and accompanying instructions to be
used in determining the extent to which countries [had been]
55. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1971, supra note 32; and the international
financial institutions legislation, supra note 41.
56. Letter from Charles B. Rangel to Elmer B. Staats, Comptroller General
of the United States, May 17, 1972.
57. Letter from E.H. Morse, Jr., for the Comptroller General, to Charles B.
Rangel, June 5, 1972.

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics

19743 INTERNATIONAL DRUG TRAFFIC

cooperating with the United States in preventing the illegal
production, processing and trafficking of narcotics.58
The GAO reported that the draft criteria were to be approved first
by the Coordinating Subcommittee of the President's Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control (CCINC), then by
CCINC itself. The criteria were to be applied at the Regional Interagency Narcotics Coordinating Group Level.59
On August 16, 1972, CCINC approved procedures for determining whether foreign assistance should be suspended for noncooperation in the control of drug trafficking. When the Coordinating Subcommittee identified a suspected noncooperating country, an in-depth review of the country's anti-drug activities was to
be conducted by the appropriate Regional Interagency Narcotics
Control Committee. That committee was then to prepare a detailed
report for CCINC action. If CCINC concluded that there had not
been adequate cooperation, the Secretary of State in his capacity as
CCINC chairman was to recommend that the President make a formal determination. Following such an affirmative determination,
CCINC was to supervise the implementation of the statutory termination of foreign aid and related support.0t
Notwithstanding the statutory provisions and the elaborate administrative procedures, President Nixon never made a negative
determination on drug control activities in regard to any country
receiving foreign assistance from the United States or a loan from
58. Letter from Elmer B. Staats to Charles B. Rangcl, Letter Report
B-176095, July 14, 1972, at 1.
59. Id. These Groups, chaired by State Department personnel, meet regularly
to discuss drug problems in their respective geographic areas.
60. Cabinet Comm. on Int'l Narcotics Control, Proposed Procedures for
Determining Whether Foreign Assistance Should be Suspended for Failure to
Take Adequate Steps Against Narcotics Production, Processing or Trafficking. at
2-3 (August 1972).
61. Id. at 3.
In contrast to CCINC's punitive obligations, one federal bureau did take
affirmative steps to encourage international drug control cooperation. In late
1972, the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial
Policies (NAC), chaired by then Secretary of the Treasury George P. Schultz,
recommended that the US. give spedal attention and support to country or
regional projects which might help curb illicit drug trafficking so long as the
proposals for economic or technical assistance met the international financial
institution's economic requirements. NAC suggested that the United States also
help with feasibility studies and necessary documentation for loan applications
for these banks for narcotics control-related projects. National Advisory Council
on International Monetary and Financial Policies, Annual Report July 1.
1971-June 30, 1972 (1972) , at 47.
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the Inter-American Development Bank, the Asian Development
Bank, the World Bank or the International Development Association.

V.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE THREAT OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

United States foreign assistance has played a significant role in
international economics and politics. Between fiscal years 1968 and
1972, the United States distributed approximately $7.51 billion in
bilateral economic aid, $594 million in contributions to international organizations, and $1.71 billion in contributions to international
02

financial institutions.

A. U.S. BilateralAid
In the realm of bilateral as distinct from multilateral aid, the
United States is in a somewhat better position to impose its policy
wishes on recipient nations. However, even in the area of narcotics
control where there is substantial international agreement on general aims, 63 political, economic and diplomatic reverberations might
flow from a U.S. attempt to dictate what a recipient government regards as internal policy. But if, for example, crop substitution programs prove to be economically feasible replacements for opium
poppy cultivation, the statutory leverage of the aid cut-off provision
of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1971 may be more palatablewhether that leverage is implicit or explicit. Nevertheless, before the
United States seeks to enforce the cut-off provision against a noncooperating nation, such factors as that country's national pride, its
reaction to American "meddling" in its internal affairs," 4 and its
possible resentment of economic coercion 5 should be considered.
62. U.S. Dep't of State, United States Foreign Policy 1972: A Report of the
Secretary of State, at 46. (Pub. 8699, General Foreign Policy Series 274) (1978).
63. The majority of sovereign nations are signatories to one or more international narcotics control treaties, contributors to the United Nations Fund for Drug
Abuse Control, or members of the United Nations Commission on Narcotic
Drugs. That does not mean, however, that treaty obligations or financial contrl.
butions are necessarily accurate indicators of the degree of a government's drug
control activities.
64. This is a major reason for Congressman Robert H. Steele's belief that
cutting off aid to Turkey to coerce cooperation in drug control would have been
unsuccessful. See note 15, supra, and accompanying text.
65. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's attempts to improve US.-Latin
American relations, for example, brought closer to the surface Latin America's
unhappiness with the link between foreign aid and compensation for nationalized
or expropriated American-owned property. Howe, A Sense of New Worth in
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Some countries fear either that cooperation with the United
States under threat of aid suspension or economic dislocation following suppression of opium poppy cultivation would encourage
Communist or other insurgent forces seeking to overthrow the
government. 66 Would implementation of the aid cut-off provision
constitute coercion or the type of economic arm-twisting which developing countries cannot long withstand? Would it be regarded as
a first cousin to the kind of pressure which the United States condemned during the recent Arab oil boycott of pro-Israeli nations?
Like the oil boycott, there would be a specific policy goal belhind
the action. The United States has put itself on record as willing, at
least verbally, to place economic punishment of drug-producing or
drug-trafficking nations ahead of the potential diplomatic reperc'ussions of aid suspension. Of course, since the statutory mandate has
not been used to date, it is impossible to predict precisely what
those repercussions might, in fact, be.
In view of growing congressional discontent over foreign ai(d, 07
as shown by the House's initial refusal in early 1974 to increase
the American contribution to the International Development Association, 68 a safe prediction might be that American "largesse" 69
will be tied with tighter strings in the future. Multilateral and
bilateral assistance authorizations have already been used to restrict
Latin America, New York Times, Feb. 24, 1974 (Week in Review), at 3. cols. 3-5;
Lowenthal, Improving Inter-American Ties. New York Times, Feb. 20. 1974, at
35, cols. 2-4.
66. A statement issued by an International Narcotics Control Study Mission
to Southeast Asia, composed of 5 members of the House of Representatives,
asserted that the U.S. considered "insurgencies more serious titan opium production . . .'" International Narcotics Control Study Mission to Southeast Asia.
Statement, Sept. 7. 1973, at 2. See also World Drug Traffic and Its Impact on U.S.
Security, pt. 1, supra note 44, at 27, relating to Thailand (testimony of General
Walt); The US. Heroin ProblCm and SoutIeast Asia. supra note 46. at 34. rclating to the Thai situation.
67. In the House Foreign Affairs Committee report on the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1971, for example, three conservative Republicans on te Commiuce-H.
R. Gross (Iowa), Edward J. Derwinski (Ill.), and Vernon IV. Thomson (Wis.)
-called for a "farewell to alms.' H.R. Rep. No. 92-380, supra note 18, at 54.
They charged that foreign aid was inflationary and contributed to unfavorable
balances of payments. Id. On the other hand. liberal Committee member Ron
Dellums (D-Calif.) opposed the legislation because it terminated aid to neither
Portugal, based on its African colonial policies, nor Brazil, for its tretmenL of
the Indian minority there and its holding of political prisoners. Id. at 53.
68. The bill, H.R. 11354, was defeated by a vote of 298-155, 120 Cong. Rc.
H151 (daily ed. Jan. 23, 1974). The House later reversed itself and passed the
bill by a vote of 225-140. 120 Cong. Rec. H6111-50 (daily ed. July 2, 1974).
69. H.R. Rep. No. 92-380, supra note 18, at 54 (minority views of Gross.
Derwinski and Thomson).
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aid on narcotics and expropriation policy grounds.0 The Mansfield Amendment 7' was the tool Congress chose to cut off funds
for American fighting in South Vietnam. Congress mandated the
cessation of aid to Greece in protest of the military dictatorship's
refusal to restore constitutional government, subject to presidential
waiver in the case of "overriding requirements of the national
security of the United States."7 -' The Foreign Assistance Act of
1971 also contained a requirement that aid to Pakistan be ended,
subject to a presidential determination that the government there
was "cooperating fully in allowing the situation in East Pakistan to
return to reasonable stability . ."73
B. Multilateral Aid Through International Financial Institutions
But perhaps the potentially more explosive situations involve
those in which multilateral assistance-channeled through international development institutions-is tied to United States-mandated
conditions. Among the reasons for which such institutions were established and are operated was the hope that the responsibility of
supporting development would be shared by the industrialized
nations.74 At the same time, it was felt that these institutions would
promote foreign investment and a long-range balanced growth of
international trade. 7. However, many of the less developed coun70. In addition to the previous discussion of the Gonzalez amendments (text
accompanying note 37 supra), see also 22 U.S.C.A. § 2370 (c) as to bilateral foreign
assistance restrictions in cases of uncompensated expropriation or nationalization.
This statute includes the Hickenlooper Amendment, 22 U.S.C.A. § 2570 (c) (2).
71. 85 Stat. 423; 86 Stat. 734; 86 Stat. 1184.
72. 22 U.S.C.A. § 2370 (v) (Supp. 1974) 86 Stat. 27. See H.R. Rep. No.
92-761, supra note 31, at 27, and S. Rep. No. 92-590, supra note 31, at 27.
73. 22 U.S.C.A. § 2370 (w) (Supp. 1974, 86 Stat. 27-28. See H.R. Rep. No.
92-761, supra note 31, at 27, and S. Rep. No. 92-590, supra note 31, at 27.
Other examples of statutory aid restrictions include limitations on assistance
to: communist countries, 22 U.S.C.A. § 2370 (f); countries preparing for aggres.
sive military activities against the U.S. or nations receiving American foreign aid,
22 U.S.C.A. § 2370 (i); countries permitting or failing to prevent mob destruction of U.S. property without adequate compensation, 22 U.S.C.A. § 2370 0);
countries trading with North Vietnam "... so long as the regime in North
Vietnam gives support to hostilities in South Vietnam," 22 U.S.C.A. § 2370 (n);
and countries seizing U.S. fishing vessels, 22 U.S.C.A. § 2370 (o), but see note 40
supra.
74. United States Foreign Policy 1972, supra note 62, at 47.
75. Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, T.I.A.S. 1502, 2 U.N.T.S. 134, art. 1, §§ (ii) (iii) (1947). For
other statements of the general goals and purposes of these institutions, see
Agreement Establishing the Asian Development Bank, 17 U.S.T. 1420, T.I.A.S.
6103. ch. 1. art. 1 (1965); Agreement Establishing the Inter-American Develop.
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tries still believe that World Bank investments and policies are determined by the financially powerful nations.76
The United States does exert great control over these institutions. During fiscal years 1968-1973, total U.S. contributions
ranged from some $120.6 million in 1969 to approximately $323.5
million in 1973.77 Under the weighted system of proportionate voting used by these institutions, the voice of the United States can be
powerful,7 8 even decisive,79 when it seeks to direct decisions on
policy or on individual loans and credits.
The National Advisory Council on International Monetary
and Financial Policies has expressed the view that the international
development lending institutions cannot continue to operate without
American participation8 0 The Council emphasized that the lending pattern of these institutions "has generally coincided with U.S.
interests." 8 Left unspoken were the Council's predictions of what
would happen if those lending patterns conflicted, rather than coincided, with American interests as determined by the President.
The undesirability of U.S. imposition of policies on the multilateral institutions has been expressed both by the Administration
and on Capitol Hill. In testimony before a House Appropriations
ment Bank, 10 U.S.T. 5029, T.I.A.S. 4397. art. 1 (1959) ; Articles of Agreement of
the International Development Association. I I U.S.T. 2284, T.I.A.S. 4607. art. I
(1960); Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations 1973. Hearings
Before the Subcomm, on Foreign Operations and Related Agencies of the House
Comm. on Appropriations, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. I, at 107, 149 (1972) (testimony of John M. Hennessy, Acting Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs).
76. Comment, Regional Development Banks, 4 J.L. & Econ. Development 93
(1969).
77. Dep't of the Treasury, Combined Statement of Receipts, Expenditures
and Balances of the United States Government, (fiscal )ears 1968-1978).
78. As of 1972, U.S. voting power in the international financial institutions
was as follows: World Bank-23.01%; International Development Assication25.65%; Inter-American Development Bank-39.69%; Asian Development Bank8A22%. Foreign Affairs Division, Congressional Research Service. Library of
Congress, prepared for the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs. The United States
and the Multilateral Development Banks, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 202. 20-4. 208. 212
(Comm. Print 1974).
79. As of fiscal year 1973, the U.S. on seven occasions had either voted
against World Bank, IDA, or IDB loans to nations with which the US. had an
expropriation/nationalization dispute, or it had abstained on those votes; but the
loans were nevertheless approved. With respect to the Fund for Special Opera.
tions of IDB, the U.S. has enough voting power by itself to defeat a loan
application. National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial
Policies, Annual Report, July 1, 1972-June 30, 1973, at 23.
80. National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial
Policies, Annual Report July 1. 1972-Junc 30, 1973, supra note 79. at 17.
81. Id. at 23.
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subcommittee, John R. Petty, at the time Assistant Secretary of the
Treasury for International Affairs, stressed this point:
The United States does not and should not seek to dominate
policy making in a multilateral institution in which it is only
one of many members and to which it provides only a portion
of the capital. It is legitimate, nevertheless, for the United
States to be concerned that its important policy interests and
policy initiatives be reasonabl[y] taken into account in the in82
stitution's policy formulation.
Following House approval of the Rangel amendments, the sponsor
pointed out that the amendments would not enable the United
States to dictate policy to the international financial institutions.8s
In Representative Rangel's view, while the United States should
not "arrogantly impose [its] mandate" on the multilateral institutions, American policy objectives, such as international drug control, should nevertheless be borne in mind.8 4
Would the casting of a negative U.S. vote during consideration
of a loan application submitted by a noncooperating nation in the
fight against drug trafficking violate U.S. treaty obligations? Have
earlier negative votes on loan applications by expropriating nations
violated U.S. treaty obligations?
Article 36 of the Asian Development Bank Agreement prohibits the Bank and its officers from interfering in or being influenced
by the political affairs or political character of a member
country.8 5 The World Bank's Articles of Agreement contain a sim.
ilar provision. 0
It might be persuasively argued that a government which expropriates or nationalizes foreign holdings without adequate compensation throws a shadow of doubt on its fiscal ability to repay an
institutional loan. The prospects of repayment are among the criteria which each bank must consider in its evaluation of a loan
application.8 7 Acts such as uncompensated expropriation, general82. Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1972, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Foreign Operations and Related Agencies of the
House Comm. on Appropriations, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 252 (1971).
83. 118 Cong. Rec. 2438 (1972).
84. Id.
85. Agreement Establishing the Asian Development Bank, supra note 75, art.

36, § 2.
86. Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and
I)evelopment, supra note 75, art. IN', § 10. See also the Agreement Establishing

the International Development Association, supra note 75, art. V, §§ 1 (g), 6.
87. Agreement Establishing the Inter-American Development Bank, supra

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics

1974] INTERNATIONAL DRUG TRAFFIC

ly viewed with disfavor in the international financial community,
could be interpreted as evidence of internal economic instability or
reluctance to meet financial obligations. If an international financial
institution follows the American lead and rejects a loan application
on such grounds, it might, after all, defend its actions by labeling
them economic, as opposed to political.
However, when questions of internal national policy are involved, such as a government's policy on drug production or processing within its own borders, the issue of political considerations
becomes more complex. Since the agreements establishing each of
these institutions require that only economic considerations affect
decision-making,88 the United States' injection of the narcotics issue into the deliberations raises serious problems. Although the
suppression of drug trafficking is a widely accepted goal within the
community of nations s9 the danger arises that other influential
members might attempt to introduce their own domestic policy
priorities into the decision-making processes of these institutions.
At the same time, a trend toward inclusion of noneconomic
criteria in the loan approval mechanism is likely to mean that the
policy priorities of the underdeveloped members, unless shared by
their financial big brothers, will have little effect on loan decisions.
Under these circumstances, the fear of big power domination of the
international financial institutions could become a reality.
On the other hand, should such a trend develop, it would be
limited, in almost all cases, to policy concerns shared by the majority of member nations. But this is not to say that the United States
would always be among that majority. If members of the EDB decided not to grant loans to nations which sheltered plane hijackers,
the United States would probably voice praise. But what would the
American reaction be if the World Bank voted to deny a loan to Israel-a member-under political pressure from the Arab states,
joined by Western governments dependent on Middle East oil?

VI. CONCLUSION

The United States has the right, as a sovereign nation, to determine that its direct or indirect contributions to other countries be
note 75, art. III, § 7; Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, supra note 75, art. III, § 4; Artides of Agreement of the International Development Association, supra note 75. art. V, § 1;
Agreement Establishing the Asian Development Bank, supra note 75, art. 14.
88. Id.
89. See note 63 supra and accompanying text.
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withheld from recipients which do not act to control drug traffic.
The legitimate American concern for the effects of international
narcotics traffic on its own citizens should certainly be a high-priori.
ty foreign policy item.
But the abuse of dangerous drugs is not limited to the United
States. It is a growing problem around the world. As such, it is a
credible topic for United Nations action. The U.N. already has a
Commission on Narcotics Abuse, an International Narcotics Control Board and a Fund for Drug Abuse Control. Drug abuse--like
environmental destruction, ocean resources and economic development-is a global concern with little regard for national borders.
U.N. sanctions, like the economic boycott of Rhodesia, have the advantage of unifying significant, though not necessarily unanimous,
world support. U.N. action may also more effectively reach those
drug-producing nations with which the United States has little contact and to which the U.S. gives no aid. If a determination of
noncooperation in the suppression of narcotics traffic were made
by a U.N. agency, the stigma of American dictation of the terms
under which multilateral aid is granted would be removed. Domestic feathers would still be ruffled, but the United Nations, not
the United States, would do the ruffling.
Until such time as the United Nations agrees to determine
sanctions against drug-producing and drug-trafficking countries on
a systematic basis, it is not unreasonable to expect the United States
to wield its own economic big stick. In executing the statutory provisions, however, the United States must keep firmly in mind the
purposes of bilateral and multilateral aid and the possible effects on
the behavior of other donor nations. Dollars, what one Congressman described as "Uncle Sam's calling cards,"90 make a powerful
weapon.
ERIC FREEDMAN
90. International Aspects of the Narcotics Problem, supra note 1, at 58
(testimony of Rep. Schener).
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